DePauw University

Scholarly and Creative Work from DePauw University
Education Studies Faculty publications

Education Studies

10-5-2018

Pedagogy of the ‘not’: Negation, Exodus, and Postdigital Temporal
Regimes
Derek Ford
DePauw University, derekford@depauw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.depauw.edu/educ_facpubs
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Accepted manuscript of article originally published in: Ford, D.R. "Pedagogy of the ‘not’: Negation, Exodus,
and Postdigital Temporal Regimes." Postdigit Sci Educ (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/
s42438-018-0009-4 The final publication is available via Springer at: https://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007/s42438-018-0009-4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Education Studies at Scholarly and Creative Work
from DePauw University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Education Studies Faculty publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly and Creative Work from DePauw University.

Pedagogy of the ‘not’: Negation, exodus, and postdigital temporal regimes
Abstract: Postdigital capitalist time is characterized by an incessant acceleration that
homogenizes time and weds us to the present by making it so we have to constantly catch up and
re/learn relearn the latest apps, social media configurations, operating systems, and so on. This
reinforces imperialism, blocks resistance, and ensnares us in the present. To short-circuit this, I
articulate an exo-exopedagogy to suspend postdigital time and free our subjectivity from its
ensarement in the present. This provides an alternative educational mode of life to the lifelong
learning apparatus that sustains postdigital capitalist time. Specifically, I turn to the “not,” a
fundamental and omnipresent word whose radical potential lies in its ability to clear out
oppositions and open up a radical indeterminancy that is always untimely. Reading Paolo
Virno’s work on negation and exodus, I argue that negation entails an exodus from exopedagogy,
one that alters the meaning and categories from which exopedagogy withdraws. As a concrete
example of exo-exopedagogy, I offer a factional struggle inside the New York City Teachers
Union. Before concluding, I spend some time with Sandy Grande’s important critiques of
Eurocentrism and progress in western critical education. I do this to demonstrate how a
pedagogy of the not helps circumvent these past errors through its accommodation of—or, better,
insistence on—variegated temporalities.
Keywords: exodus, time, sleep, suspension, negation, Paolo Virno
In the postdigital age, anything seems possible but everything seems impossible. On the
one hand, any group can start a trending hashtag and radically intervene in and redirect a
segment of popular discourse. Disparate groups of organizers and militants can connect, build,
and coordinate actions and campaigns, linking different movements and spaces together into one
(think Occupy). On the other hand, capital and state powers make their own interventions,
blocking or demoting news sites critical of their power, or cutting off—or, in the case of Iran in
2009, not cutting off—service.1 Even without considering the massive state and capital
intervention in the digital age, we can still find the basis of this contradictory feeling of
possibility and impossibility. The rapidity of the rise and fall of trending hashtags and their
frequency of turnover makes the impact tenuous at best and doomed at worst. The intensity of
the momentum of social movements or critiques is followed just as soon by naysays and
movement critics.
The digitization of life began as a deeply contradictory process. The internet, which
promised openness and equality only exacerbated economic and political inequality. As we use it
to generate new connections, knowledges, and even political actions, our connections are
expropriated by the corporations that own the digital platforms and other vital infrastructure
(Dean, 2009). And while it was built by hackers and amateurs, it was a massive state and military
operation (Jandrić & Barbrook, 2017). I begin here by emphasizing these contradictions because,
as Gregory Bourassa (2018) reminds us, the stories we tell about capitalism “register certain
political sensibilities at a given moment” and “reveal hidden statements about social movements,
anti-capitalist struggles, and the theoretical resources relied upon or developed in order to make
sense of or discredit these movements and struggles” (pp. 1-2). Rather than the apocalypticism of
capitalist realism that presents capitalism as an indomitable force, Bourassa begins his work with
the ever-present fragility of neoliberal capitalism, a parasitic form of capital that relies not so
much on exploitation but on appropriation. As such, Bourassa wants to produce forms of

subjectivity autonomous from capital and its forms of life through postschool imaginaries. What
I’m interested in, however, is how to nourish and enact a postdigital pedagogy in order to
suspend postdigital capitalist time and free our subjectivity from its ensnarement in the present.
The paper begins with an examination of the role of time in ordering society, and the role
of capitalist production in ordering time. I characterize postdigital time—a capitalist
temporality—as an incessant acceleration that acts to homogenize time and wed us to the present
by making it so we have to constantly catch up to the present. While the impulse of this is no
doubt economic (the realization of value), it is crucially undergirded by a pedagogical logic
wherein we have to perpetually learn and relearn the latest apps, social media configurations,
operating systems, and so on. After giving a concrete example of how this temporal regime
reinforces imperialism and blocks resistance, I bring in two strategies of refusal: sleep and
idleness/solidarity. Both of these slow down time—for the simple reason that they take time—so
we can detach from the present. What these political and economic strategies need, however, is
another educational mode of life, without which they cannot overcome the pedagogical logic of
postdigital time. To do this, I call on Paolo Virno’s work on negation and articulate a pedagogy
of suspension that initiates and sustains such a detachment, wresting us free from the neverending learning of the present. As an example of negation, the ‘not’ is a particularly powerful
entry into suspension because of how fundamental it is to language and how omnipresent it is in
practice. And yet the radical potential of this small word is constantly suppressed.
The ‘not’ clears out oppositions and thereby exposes us to a radical indeterminacy and
potentiality that is always untimely. On first pass, this is the temporal axis of what Tyson Lewis
(2012) calls exopedagogy, a kind of pedagogy immanent in social movements that moves past
the public/private binary and toward the common. Yet Virno’s writing on exodus draws out how
his theory of negation augments exodus—and thereby exopedagogy—making it richer with even
more alternatives and possibilities. To be specific, I argue that negation entails an exodus from
exopedagogy, one that alters the meaning of the categories exopedagogy withdraws from
(including the public and private). I present the factional struggle between the communists and
professionalists inside the New York City Teachers Union to illustrate this exo-exopedagogy.
Before concluding, I spend some time with Sandy Grande’s important critiques of Eurocentrism
and progress in western critical education. I do this to demonstrate how negation as suspension
helps circumvent these past errors through its accommodation of—or, better, insistence on—
variegated temporalities.
Postdigital capitalist time
Much more than an economic system, capitalism is a kind of temporal regime. Marx (1973) put
it succinctly in his Grundrisse notebooks: “Economy of time, to this all economy ultimately
reduces itself” (p. 173). Each society has to “order” time in at least one way, and in a society
based on the maximization of profit, time is something—a commodity—with value insofar as it
is that which allows for the production of surplus-value. The definition of capitalist value is, in
fact, socially-necessary labor time, or the average duration of time it takes to produce a given
commodity with the average skill, technology, and other conditions. Here, time is understood
and experienced as chronological, wherein events unfold or develop in succession. A moment
passes and another one arrives. That time is hegemonically configured as linear in education is
confirmed by Anna Bennett and Penny Jane Burke (2017) in their study of time in higher
education. They make a compelling argument that we need to reveal the taken for granted

functioning of time as it is inscribed in the structures and relations of higher education by
forefronting the historical and social construction of temporalities. They “highlight the
importance of recognising that time does not exist apart from context and that it is not neutral; its
constitutive parts are ontico-ontological” (p. 10). The plasticity of time is felt with the “speed
up” of academia (Meyerhoff and Noterman, 2017).
The speed of capitalist temporality, in other words, is ever accelerating, which isn’t a new
phenomenon or something unique to the “neoliberal” era. As David Harvey (2010) reminds us,
“we all too easily forget that the hour was largely an invention of the thirteenth century, that the
minute and the second became common measures only as late as the seventeenth century and
that it is only in recent times that terms like ‘nanoseconds’ have been invented” (p. 147). Faster
is always better. If time is fixed absolutely (whether that be measured by days or the life of the
sun), then the tendency is to speed-up time relatively. The proliferation of digital networked
technologies not only accelerates the time of production, but more importantly it extends the
influence of capitalist temporality to all of life. Jonathan Crary (2013) characterizes
contemporary capitalism as a system and an ideology of 24/7, or “a generalized inscription of
human life into duration without breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning. It is a
time that no longer passes, beyond clock time” (p. 8). Defined by endless transitions and caught
in a constant cycle of trying to catch up, the 24/7 “intensified rhythm precludes the possibility of
becoming familiar with any given arrangement” (p. 37). What Crary identifies is how the
temporal regime of postdigital capitalism weds us to the present by positioning us as constantly
behind, and so always having to catch up to, the present. Faced with a constant deluge of data
and an endless chronology of catastrophes, confronted by the need to constantly learn (and relearn) our media platforms, we feel a contradictory mix of helplessness and urgency that keeps
us looped into postdigital capitalism. That this temporality is postdigital means that the time of
digital technology is no longer “separate, virtual, ‘other’ to a ‘natural’ human and social life”
(Jandrić et. al., 2018, p. 893).
Maximilian Forte’s (2012) study of the 2011 US and NATO-led imperialist war on Libya
provides us with an instance of the real and devastating implications of this relationship between
postdigital time and the contemporary capitalist regime, and how it blocks resistance and
eliminates time for reflection, strategy, and solidarity. The 2011 war against Libya was justified
by an invented humanitarian emergency in which there was no time to do anything but act. Those
of us in the West were told by our governments that a popular uprising against a brutal dictator
was not only being suppressed, but was facing immanent genocide. Politicians and media like
CNN and al-Jazeera (owned by anti-Gaddafi royalty in Qatar) spread unfounded claims about
“Gaddafi bombing his own people.” There was no mention that both the US Secretary of
Defense and a high-ranking admiral said there was “no confirmation of that” (p. 242). Forte’s
study not only shows that the conflict in Libya could at best be described as a civil war, and
worse (but more accurately) as a rebellion of racist, Islamist, and pro-Western segments of
society against a popular leader who came to power in an anticolonial struggle.2 It also—and
more importantly for the purposes of this paper—shows how the temporality of the campaign
against Libya prevented any dissent. Even so-called critical and anti-war activists and
intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Chris Hedges got on board to support the war effort. To be
sure, time wasn’t the only factor driving this constellation of forces, but it was an undergirding
and enabling one.
Both Crary and Forte identify resistance as entailing restraint. Forte concludes his book
with a plea. “The next time that empire comes calling in the name of human rights,” he urges us,

“please be found standing idly by” (p. 307). On the next morning we wake up to a new
#SaveXYZ hashtag in our timelines accompanied by news articles and politicians condemning
and calling for immediate and swift action against a head of state, political party, or any
individual or grouping, we should refuse the invitation to retweet our outrage. Solidarity isn’t
demanded immediately through blackmail (“you either support us or you support a baby-killing
dictator!”) but produced through “communication, exchange reciprocity, mutual knowledge, and
trust” (p. 264). All of this, of course, takes time.
For Crary (2013), that which capitalism can never colonize or eliminate is sleep. Sure,
capitalist can cut into our sleep, extend our working days through legal, illegal, and extralegal
measures. It can degrade the quality and limit the quantity of our sleep, but it can never totally
annihilate it. Sleep is also a necessarily a physical necessiaty and a social activity in which we
are vulnerable to and dependent on others, and its common to us all. As the last barricade against
24/7 capitalism, sleep is a “radical interruption,” and “a refusal of the unsparing weight of our
global present where “the imaginings of a future without capitalism begin” (p. 128). Although
Crary doesn’t expand on this much, I imagine sleep as a barricade precisely because it is a
blocked terrain from which one advances. The point is not just to sleep, but to advance from
sleep to slow down more generally so we can be detached from the present. Yet in order to
advance from sleep, we need to address the pedagogical logic of postdigital capitalist time:
lifelong learning. More than that, we need to develop an alternative educational mode so that we
don’t merely sleep to wake back up to the same temporal regime. In what follows, I offer the
suspension of negation as a pedagogical manner of initiating and sustaining such a detachment.
Time as pedagogy
There is a certain dominant temporality within educational institutions, settings, and relations in
Western societies. Gert Biesta (2017) shows how the concepts of change, learning, development,
schooling, the child, and progress are all fundamentally temporal in that they happen over time.
Indeed, he notes that today time determines educational processes much more than any
educational goals or content, as “the school day is over… when time is up, not when learning has
finished” (p. 88). While Biesta homes in on time within the realm of education, there is a more
generalized pedagogy of time, a phrasing I use to signal the educational force of time and how it
disciplines us instead of the role of time in schooling and pedagogy. For example, under
capitalism, time is commodified, endowed with an exchange value, something we can save,
spend, waste, manage, give, and take. If we don’t or can’t discipline ourselves to time-ascommodity, if we don’t or can’t match the speed of our bodies and minds to the speed of capital,
then we are discounted, disabled, even annihilated.
Recent literature in philosophy of education identifies the contemporary educational
ordering of society as the learning society, which tightly binds us to the future (Ford, 2018a,
2018b; Lewis, 2017; Wozniak, 2016; 2017). As Tyson Lewis (2017) remarks, “The rhythm of
learning is one that is always about the future, about guilt over the status of one’s debt” (p. 26).
The crushing weight of debt that we must repay structures so much of our lives and determines,
if not the decisions we make, at least the coordinates within which we make such decisions (“I
would declare this major but I don’t think there will be employment opportunities,” or “these are
the majors I can declare because they have strong employment outcomes”). Jason Wozniak
(2016) shows how, “credit is a time-disciplining technique. Those who lend money appropriate
the time of those to whom they lend” (p. 75). If money is a representation and store of (socially-

necessary) labor time, then credit is a claim on future labor-time. Our future obligations
structure and delimit our present actions, instituting a rhythm of linear time as exchange value
(Wozniak, 2017). The problem, in sum, is that we are so securely wedded to and entrenched in
the present via the future that revolutionary breaks and upheavals are unthinkable, or thinkable
only as impossible. One pervading manifestation of this is lifelong learning, wherein we must
perpetually learn in order to update our skills, habits, qualifications, knowledges, and so on in
order to remain competitive. With debt always over our heads, the demand to always learn exerts
an almost unbearable force on our lives. In fact, we can even learn better sleep habits so that we
can better maximize our productivity for capital! There are all sorts of improvement guides out
there in magazines, on websites, and in books to help us re-learn how to sleep to more
appropriately accommodate the dictates of the marketplace (e.g., Stanley 2018).3
A key task for those of us who want to create a post-capitalist world, then, concerns the
theorization and enactment of alternative temporal pedagogies that function precisely to divorce
us from the present. Negation is one such alternative, one that is particularly powerful because of
how fundamentally it structures language and being. It’s powerful, that is, because it is a
ubiquitous yet untapped presence. Negation in the marxist tradition is often synonymous with, or
closely related to, opposition. Thus, in a famous passage from the end of the first volume of
Capital, Marx (1867/1967) shows how individual private property is negated into its opposite of
capitalist private property, which in turn is negated into the opposite, “the possession in common
of the land and of the means of production” (p. 715). Communism is, in other words, the
negation of its opposite, capitalism, and through the negation of the negation capitalism becomes
communism. This is a limited sense of negation—inherited from Hegel (or a particular reading
of Hegel—that tethers it to a dialectical process that progresses through the unfolding of
contradictions. To break through 24/7 capitalist time, we need a more radical sense of negation.
While we could pursue negation in a number of places—from Theodor Adorno to José Esteban
Muñoz—I want to turn to a recent book Paolo Virno to get to the politics, semiology, and the
affect of the ‘not.’ This, in turn, helps me bridge the gap between time and politics via pedagogy.
As a fundamental linguistic particle, ‘not’ passes through our minds, out from our
mouths, and on our screens often and without thought or even notice. As Virno (2018) argues,
however, the ‘not’ is the universal equivalent of language and a powerful ontological and
affective actor. As he proffers, the ‘not’ “participates in the description of the world and
determines to a great extent the form assumed by the actions and passions of the human animal”
(p. 53). Negation, I want to propose, can be developed as a pedagogical mode of encountering
others, ourselves, and the world in a way that attunes us not to what is but to what could be
through an emphasis on what is not, and which, in so doing, unfastens us from the present and
suspends the tempo of 24/7. To articulate such a pedagogy, however, we have to move from the
classroom to the structure of language, before moving back into the public sphere.
Negation on this reading doesn’t signal what is opposite or contrary. To say that “I am
not a good teacher” or “I do not like grading papers” does not mean that “I am a bad teacher” or
“I hate grading papers.” The ‘not’ augments a predicate not by an antithesis but by “its
opposition to all other signs, namely, by not being what they are” (p. 34). When I state, “I am not
a good teacher,” I mean that, as a teacher, I am anything other than good. Not only could I be an
excellent or a terrible teacher, but I could also be a sick teacher, a problematic teacher, a stupid
teacher, an unreliable teacher; literally any other kind of teacher. Negation implies difference
without end: “I am not a good teacher” only means “I am different from a good teacher.” There
is no definition, only possibility and potentiality. And this is where the rich praxis of the not

emerges: it opens up the subject and referent to an endless and infinite indeterminacy and
potentiality. When it isn’t followed quickly by a clarification (“I am not a good teacher, I am an x
teacher), when the negated semantic content is left hanging, so too are we. This is a minor
pedagogical move. Its implications are not minor.
When negation isn’t explicitly activated, it’s still there as a condition of possibility of
speaking and sense making. In this way, linguistic negation is thoroughly ontological, although it
manifests as a present absence. In other words, it’s only because we can say that something is not
that we can say that something is. Negation thus keeps open the gap between the world and
signification, between meaning and sense. Virno likens it to the Hebrew vowel aleph that serves
as a backing for words but cannot itself be said (or heard). Negation is ontological because it
installs a gap between the world and word, between sense and meaning. For example, we only
know what it means when I remark, “that was a bold essay” because of the primary lingering
‘not’ before bold. This lingering ‘not’ stands in for the sum of the negative differences that
constitute language. “Ontological negation,” as Virno puts it, “institutes and preserves the
neutrality of sense. By virtue of the gap that separates it from denotation and the illocutionary
force (or, if you prefer, from the facts of the external world and psychic drives), the sense of a
statement is always suspended between alternative developments, maintaining a perfect
equidistance from them” (p. 81). Sense is separated from language and so concurrently
positioned toward the ‘not’ and the content to which it is attached. This is not to say, of course,
that all actions happen through language.
Suspension is the praxis of negation, which means that negation operates by keeping
sense indeterminate to meaning and signification. Rather than suppressing, disavowing, or
annihilating the stated content, negation retains even that which is negated. This is a rule of
negation. Virno writes that when stating, “I do not mean to offend you,” I am at the same time
acknowledging my capacity to intentionally offend. “Rather than opposing and cancelling each
other,” Virno sums up, “this knowledge and this refusal are mutually sustaining: I know my
intention to offend precisely because I refuse it; I refuse such an intention precisely because I
know it. Both knowledge and non-acceptance realize themselves in the negative statement ‘I
have no intention to offend’” (p. 204). While the negation does not signal the contrary, it
nonetheless sustains it. What is more, however, is that the operative negation also sustains all
other potentialities. This is suspension in the fullest sense, without any exclusions whatsoever.
The negation points to the stated content, the negated content, and everything else. In order to
state “I am not studying” I must admit the act of “studying” into discourse and possibility even
as I turn away from the act and toward everything besides studying. The most concise and
indeterminate formulation here would be the double negative, “I am not not studying.”
Negation as the temporal axis of exo-exopedagogy
The ‘not’ enacts the non-contemporaneity of sense and being with the present, an ontological
attribute increasingly hidden or mitigated against in the postdigital era, in which everything is
present all the time. Crary (2013) is right to claim that “our time is the calculated maintenance of
an ongoing state of transition” (p. 37, emphasis added). Transition isn’t new, of course, but
historically between radical technological transitions there were periods of stability. While, say,
the introduction of television inaugurated new kinds of social relations and perceptions, these
were fixed for several decades. This is no longer the case in the postdigital age. Indeed, it’s
difficult now to call any technological development radical or revolutionary, because we know

another one is just around the corner. And the promises of technological developments
advancing justice or equality or any real common value are now in tatters.
In this configuration, negation offers us a constant suspension that can form a resistance,
one that complements idleness and sleep by betraying the reality of postdigital capitalist
temporality.4 If we really were bound to the present then negation would be impossible, for there
would be no gap between meaning and sense:
The texture of any actuality, or presence, is assembled from environmental facts and
emotional stimuli—from those facts and stimuli of which denotations and illocutionary
forces are the doubles within statements. The autonomy of sense from denotation (i.e.
from the fact) and from the illocutionary force (i.e. from the stimulus) thus implies its
autonomy from all that we have good reason to consider as present. (Virno, 2018, p. 79)
Negation’s praxis of suspension hinges on this non-contemporaneity and reveals and enacts the
neutrality of sense. Negation allows for non-presence because it allows for that which is to be
otherwise. If we could only ever affirm what is, then there would be no need for or possibility to
be separated from the present. There would be no language, no difference, no possibility. The
possible, as it turns out, always encompasses the its own negation: “When we say ‘It is possible
that you love me,’ we also say at the same time ‘It is possible that you do not love me’” (p. 99).
Through removing the subject from the present, the praxis of negation opens drives up to
orientation and direction, potentially politicizing the drive and collectivizing the subject. In fact,
negation conditions the intersection between epistemology and ontology, between word and
action, the linguistic and non-linguistic. Negation is both “the logical tool that determines the
discontinuity between linguistic praxis and drives” and “the key with which the former
intervenes in the latter, altering their fate” (p. 180). There are two ways in which negation
bridges drives and linguistic praxis. The first is as a threshold between the two, and the second is
as an attachment that connects the two. In the first instance, the ‘not’ is located between the
difference without positivity that makes language possible and the particular differences
enunciated (between the being and the expression of language), while in the second instance it is
located between what is done through language and what is done outside of language. These two
are themselves linked: “negation enables the retroaction of statements on emotions and on
instinctual behaviors only because it translates into a concrete discursive operation that
detachment from the environment and that gap from the present that characterize language
considered as a whole” (p. 185). Once subsumed under the praxis of negation, drives attain an
independence and become susceptible to direction.
To make this less abstract, Virno gives the example of pain. The affirmation of pain (“I
am in pain”) is no more than a signal of a state, and so does not enable the independence or
direction of the drive. The negation of pain (“I am not in pain”) frees the drive by divorcing it
from the feeling of pain. Limited to the affirmation of pain, the affect only exists when present,
and its articulation is limited to the expression of the feeling. When negated, however, “pain does
not disappear but, separating itself from the particular circumstances that have caused it, often
gives rise to the feeling of our enduring, and hence irredeemable, vulnerability” (p. 194). The
subject is thus removed from the present of pain as the painful affect is subjected to multifarious
deployments. Negation, to put it differently, opens the drive up as it gives form to it. It also
generalizes the subjects vulnerability to pain, for it bring to consciousness that one can not be in
pain, establishing a different relation to pain, which is now free. Be that as it may, there is a

distinct difference between this reality and our experiences, which leads Virno to declare that
this difference or heterogeneity “acquires visibility and weight only when it asserts itself in
praxis, transforming to a certain extent our vital conducts” (p. 206). There is the reality of
negation, and the appearance of negation, and so the task is to show this struggle and to inhabit
the gap in time opened up by the ‘not.’ This is one way in which to view the preparation for and
inauguration of revolutionary events: the proclamation of the ‘not.’
At first blush, the pedagogy of negation emerges as a form of exopedagogy, or education
as exodus (Lewis, 2012). Opposed to oppositional logic, exodus entails, as Virno (2008)
formulates it, “Neither A, nor not-A, neither resigned acquiescence nor struggle to seize power in
a predetermined territory, but an eccentric B, achievable only as long as other premises are
surreptitiously introduced into the given syllogism” (p. 148). Exodus refuses the available
choices—the stated semantic content and its contrary—and finds recourse in the endless
indeterminacy of negation. Without sublating the alternatives (A or not-A), exodus instead alters
the cartography of struggle, taking advantage of alleyways and improvised passages, and
inventing new cuts through the space of power. Let’s take a strike as an example. During a strike,
two sides (management and labor) struggle over wages, hours, and conditions. The options are to
strike or fold, and the end-point for both sides is to reach a deal. An exodus from this situation
wouldn’t necessarily mean abandoning the strike or even bargaining but would explore other
options and therefore shift the coordinates of the struggle. Let’s say that during the strike the
workers took over the factory and resumed production without the bosses. In this case, the
framework for the struggle has shifted and yet the alterantives (strike or fold) are still in play.
The position these alternatives play in the new terrain, however, are different than before, and the
end-point of a successful agreement expressed through a new labor contract is no longer the only
one available. The workers may decide to organize outside the union—through community
organizations, religious groups, other unions, etc.—and expropriate the factory for good.
Virno (2004) also calls exodus a defection, an exit, which has the advantage of
“unrestrained invention which alters the rules of the game and throws the adversary completely
off balance” (p. 70). What’s interesting in this formulation is that Virno acknowledges an
adversary—or opponent—while opposing opposition. This could easily be read as a
contradiction, and perhaps it is. In fact, given what Virno tells us about negation, calling exodus
“neither A, nor not-A,” makes exodus impossible, for there is nothing that is neither A nor not-A.
A more generous reading, however, could see negation as enhancing and clarifying his earlier
articulations of exodus. In modifying the terrain of conflict and antagonism, exodus actually
alters both ends of A and the opposite of A. Stated otherwise, through moving within the
suspension of the opposing alternatives, exodus redefines those very alternatives. What we have
here is a thoroughly dynamic and relational conception of political struggle in which everything
is on the table, even what appears to be off the table.
Lewis (2012) defines exopedagogy as “a pedagogy that is immanent to social movements
that are global in nature and breaks significantly with the dialectic of the public versus the
private” (p. 845). Both the private and the public expropriate and limit the common, the former
for private property (capital) and the latter for public property (the state). Unlike the privatepublic dialectic, the common is a condition and end of production, in which what is produced
returns to the common to enhance and extend it, in an intensifying spiral.5 Both capital and the
state tame the surplus, and so block the productive capacities of the multitude as they deprive the
multitude of its products. He identifies three moves that follow from this: politically (from
citizen to pirate); metaphysically (from universal to the common, from particular to singular);

and educationally (from judgment to decision) (p. 856). The educational philosophy that comes
closest to the common is the deschooling of Ivan Illich. Illich removes education from the school
in the same way that the common removes production from the public and the private. Lewis
sees deschooling as “a piratical act that de-appropriates education as part of the commonwealth
against the sanctity of public schooling and private interests” (p. 857).
Negation adds a temporal dimension to the political, metaphysical, and educational
components of exopedagogy at the same time as it opens exopedagogy into new (old)
possibilities. Pedagogy thus requires a move from the present to the non-present. More than
another dimension, however, negation is a praxis that in turn enables the other moves for which
Lewis calls. In other words, it is only once we are divorced from the present that we can defect
from capital and the state. Nonetheless, it also requires an exodus from exopedagogy—and thus
an exo-exopedagogy—in that it alters the alternatives or dialectical oppositions of the
framework itself. It does so by opening up what the private and the public, the pirate and the
citizen, might mean once suspension wrests them free from the current landscape. It does so by
attuning us to all the possibilities beyond deschooling when one says “schooling is not
education” or “schooling is not liberating.” Thus, to wrest ourselves free from lifelong learning
we may not abandon lifelong learning but rather negate it, keeping it in play but now susceptible
to infinite alterations; exploring the infinite potentiality of lifelong learning.
This is one way to read the factional struggle between the communists and
professionalists inside the New York City Teachers Union (TU). Founded in 1916, the TU
became a formidable articulation of broader social struggles beginning in the 1930s. The victory
of the communist faction in the union was a key part of the strength of the union. The union
administration was always progressive, but when the communists began to organize within the
union, they pushed the union further to the left precisely by opening up what a teacher was. The
administration “emphasized professionalism, collaboration with management, and legislation as
ways of improving the working conditions for teachers,” while the communists “did not view
teachers as professionals but as members of the industrial working class whose major objective
was to take part in the struggle against capital” (Taylor, 2011, p. 16). The administration wanted
to maintain the identity of the teacher, which entailed not only a collaborationist orientation
toward the Board of Education, but more fundamentally limiting membership to full-time
licensed teachers. The communists wanted to open membership up and to organize substitute,
part time, and other non-licensed teachers. This followed the third party and then popular front
lines of the Communist International, which called on communists to prioritize building mass
movements. The communists won the internal struggle and membership surged. They did not
abandon their identity as teachers, but opened the identity up in the hopes of radically
reformatting the very coordinates that determined what a teacher was and could be. In other
words, the communist teachers were not teachers.

Past times
Against the constant speeding-up of postdigital capitalist time, the suspension of negation
interrupts the onslaught of transition and the constant catching up (and re-learning) we have to
do. Yet what is particularly useful about Virno’s work on negation is that it isn’t a call for
opposition or overturning, nor is it an uncritical celebration of the new or the different. It firmly
breaks with a narrative of progress that structures so many variants of critical education.

Negation, after all, is precisely not the inversion of the present for a new future; it’s a
heterogeneous operation that preserves, suspends, and innovates. The final move I want to make
in this paper is to draw out how the temporal pedagogy of negation guards against Eurocentric
and colonial narratives of progress and teleology through its release of heterogeneous
temporalities and potentialities.6
Sandy Grande (2004) most forcefully highlights the danger of these narratives in
education, including its various critical components. Her work is particularly important—and yet
seldom considered—in educational philosophy, because it emphasizes how the most well-known
philosopher of education, John Dewey’s educational philosophy “presumed the colonization of
indigenous peoples” in that his conceptions of democracy and nation—around which his
educational philosophy flowed—were “built upon the notion of ever-expanding possibility” (p.
33)—the frontier.7 Further, for those of us on the Left, Grande both provides critiques of marxist
and socialist politics while at the same time holding open the possibility that educational
practices in this tradition can “inform indigenous struggles for self-determination” (p. 33). She is
specifically interested in the project of revolutionary critical pedagogy, which she partly defends
against what she says are unfounded critiques by Samuel Bowers.8
Grande finds many of Bowers’ critiques against critical pedagogy to be justified, as
“critical pedagogy is born of a Western tradition that has many components in conflict with
indigenous cosmology and epistemology, including a view of time and progress that is linear and
an anthropocentrism that puts humans at the center of the universe” (p. 88). She is more
sympathetic to revolutionary critical pedagogy, which turns away from the Frankfurt School and
back to Marx. Thus, revolutionary critical pedagogy doesn’t valorize change in general (not all
change is desirable). Yet she still cautions that this pedagogy “is prone to promulgating its own
oppressive grand narratives by dismissing indigenous cultures as ‘primitive’ or precapitalist
entities” (p. 88). In addition, the project “is conceived of inherently as a rights-based as opposed
to a land-based project” (p. 116). And it seems, when many Leftists do turn to land they do so in
a colonial way. This is Glen Coulthard’s critique of the project of commoning in colonial settlerstates, as “the so-called commons are actually occupied lands that the First Nations have been
struggling to recover for centuries” (Malott, 2016, p. 16).
What is considered “marxism” in academia, however, is a very limited and narrow field
that is absolutely dominated by white men, particularly from Western Europe, such as the
Frankfurt School theorists. But as Asad Haider reminds us in his book, Mistaken Identity, “the
insights of this brilliant thinker, Karl Marx, did not belong to Europe… They had been refined
and developed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even here in the belly of the beast… black
Americans had shown that this legacy could not be geographically confined” (p. 3). In other
words, Benjamin, Bloch, Adorno, Virno, Negri, or Hardt don’t have a monopoly on marxism
(isn’t it curious that theorists who haven’t participated in the revolutions they write about carry
more authority in academia than the ones who have participated and even led those revolutions,
many of whom are indigenous to their land?) Harry Harootunian (2015) locates the fundamental
error of Western marxism with a “preoccupation with a matured capitalism,” which “risked
sacrificing historical capitalism, if not the historical itself, as a subject of inquiry” (p. 5).
Harootunian presents a careful reading of Marx, Lenin, José Carlos Mariátegui, Wang Yanan,
Moritarō Yamada, and others to demonstrate the rich, complex, and variegated historical account
of marxism and the politics that follow.
A central problem with Western marxism is that it reads Marx’s analysis of formal and
real subsumption as a historical account rather than as an analytical model. Formal subsumption

is when capitalism takes what comes before it and subjects it to its logics (and pursues absolute
surplus value). Under real subsumption, capitalism now produces what came before it and the
production process is totally subsumed under capitalism as the search for relative surplus value
begins. Under real subsumption, that is, all of production totally determined by capital. This is,
for example, what provides the basis of Negri’s autonomism and his recent work with Michael
Hardt, in which the social or biopolitical has been totally subsumed by capital, to which there is
no more outside.9 Harootunian importantly maintains that real subsumption was merely a model
for Marx so that he could imagine what a totalized capitalism would look like, which would then
enable him to articulate the components of such a system. At worst, real subsumption was a
projection into the future. Harootunian argues that Lukács and later the Frankfurt School saw the
commodity-form in all of society (assuming real subsumption had been realized) so that the
commodity’s “role had been transformed into one of a central performer in structuring modern
social life” and “it had become more complex, inasmuch as it now frequently was made to
exceed the form of wage labor and the objectification of social relationships. It now involved
culture in the broadest sense” (p. 37).10 It’s not hard to see how this informs theories of mass
consumption, one-dimensional beings, and so on.
In reality, however, Marx saw capitalism as “housing” “a vast, heterogeneous inventory
and ‘conjuncture’ of temporalities no longer stigmatized for having been cast out of time but
rather as expressions of contretemps, simultaneous nonsimultaneities… contemporaneous
noncontemporaneities or uneven times, and zeitwidrig, time’s turmoil, times out of joint” (p. 23).
Nothing perhaps reveals Marx’s temporal openness as his suggestion that surviving communes in
19th century Russia as progressive relative to capitalism. Particularly in his Grundrisse
notebooks of the late 1950s, Marx “rejected any linear causality that envisaged a singularly
progressive movement from one period or mode of production to the next… but rather saw the
multilinear movements as taking place in different regions and among diverse peoples” (p. 48). It
was these insights that thinkers in the Global South and elsewhere latched onto and developed.
To give just one example, Mariátegui’s historical account of Peru accounted for indigenous
communities, forms of common ownership or cultivation, Spanish colonial feudalism, and a
republican capitalism. This was made possible exactly “because Marxism was open to diverse
regional historical experiences that historical materialism had to account for, instead of
remaining narrowly constrained by a singular and singularizing dogmatic discourse applied to all
situations” (p. 140).
The temporal goal of socialism is to abolish capitalism’s abstraction of time, the way that
it imposes a homogenous temporality on people through force. By expropriating land and labor,
capital today disciplines us into a 24/7 temporal regime. But discipline is never total, and
resistance always persists. The non-presence of negation is a pedagogical manner of combatting
24/7 capitalist time in order to disrupt it not for the sake of disruption, but to allow for other
temporalities, possibilities, and forms of life to emerge. For this reason, negation is a marxist
practice in that it calls for, invites, and enacts nonlinear and disparate times. What’s important to
note here is that these alternatives are not only new or unforeseen alternatives. To be sure,
suspension is definitely not any kind of march forward to overcome the past, and it doesn’t
operate according to the logic or dictate of the one. As an exodus from exopedagogy, the
suspension of negation redefines the “citizen” from which Lewis urges educational philosophy to
move to forms of belonging and forms of sovereignty that are totally separate from and precede
the capitalist state. Exopedagogy as exodus thus does not ignore or preclude, but precisely makes
space for non-Western forms of citizenship and publicness in a non-deterministic way. As such,

the pedagogy of the ‘not’ is a bountiful and much needed praxis for coalitions and united fronts
in political and social struggles against postdigital capitalism today, and a pedagogy of the not
can counter the lifelong learning dictates that prop up the postditigal capitalist temporal regime.
This is not the end.
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See in particular chapter 2.6 of Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000).
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It’s important to note here that Harootunian acknowledges that Lukács’ theories were more complex, and he deals
with them elsewhere in his book.
2

